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Shannon: Is Zahn Gone?

IS ZAHN GONE? THE EFFECT

OF 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ON THE
"NO AGGREGATION DOCTRINE"
Joseph J. Shannon1
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are two jurisdictional requirements that need to be
established to bring a diversity-based class action law suit. The
first requirement is that the class action representative(s) must be
completely diverse from all defendants. The Supreme Court has
relaxed the diversity requirement in class action suits by requiring
only the class representative(s) to be completely diverse from the
other defendant(s), not every member of the class. 3 The second
requirement is that the class representative, as well as the other
members of the class, must satisfy the jurisdictional amount in
controversy. 4 In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,5 the Supreme
Court held that in diversity-based class action litigation multiple
plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims must each satisfy the
jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement. 6 The Court
concluded that "any plaintiff [or absent class members] without
the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even
though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims."' This
rule has been referred to by courts as the "separate and distinct
J.D. Candidate Touro Law Center 2003; Touro Law Review, Senior
Associate Editor 2002-2003.
2 Complete diversity means that all plaintiffs and all defendants are from
different states. However, in class actions, there needs to be complete
diversity between the class representative(s) and all defendant(s), not complete
diversity between every member of the class and all defendant(s). It is also

important to note that a single plaintiff can sue a class of defendants, but this is
very unlikely.
3See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cluble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (reasoning that complete diversity must be
satisfied between the class representative(s) and all defendants).
4See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Today, the jurisdictional amount must exceed
$75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. Id.
s 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
6 Id. at 300-01.
7 Id. at 300.
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doctrine" in class actions.8 This paper refers to the separate and
distinct doctrine as the "no aggregation doctrine."9 The overall
purpose of this doctrine is to prohibit separate plaintiffs from
aggregating their claims for purposes of satisfying the
jurisdictional requirement. The "no aggregation doctrine" went
unchallenged until 1990, when Congress enacted the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.10
However, what Congress did not envision was the host of
problems that an otherwise carefully drafted Section 1367 statute
could have avoided." Yet, after a careful analysis, it seems that
8 Id. The "no aggregation doctrine" was established in Troy Bank v. G.A.
Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911). However, the Court in Zahn based its
decision on long standing judicial precedents such as Troy Bank. Id. at 30001.
Also note for the purpose of this paper Zahn and its predecessors refers to
the "no aggregation doctrine."
'0 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (2001) Supplemental Jurisdiction reads in pertinent
part:
a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) or as
expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
b) In any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this
title, the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under sub-section (a) over claims by plaintiffs
against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under rule 19 of
such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under rule 24
of such rules, when exercising supplement jurisdiction over
such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.
" See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Essay, Close Enough
for Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, 40
EMORY L. REv. 1007, 1007 (1991) (stating that "section 1367 is a nightmare
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the problem is not so much with Congress but with the circuit
courts' faulty analysis of the statute. In fact, some circuit courts
have held that Section 1367 has overruled Zahn and its
predecessors. 12 On the other hand, other circuit courts have held
that the reasoning of Zahn has not been affected. 13 According to
some commentators, Congress' intention in enacting Section 1367
was unclear with respect to the holding of Zahn. 14
Yet other
commentators claim that "Zahn is still good decisional law" and
5
that Congress' intent was not to overrule Zahn.1

In addition, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court in
Free v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. 16 granted certiorari on the issue
of whether Section 1367 overruled Zahn. However, the opinion
read as follows: "Judgment affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Opinion per curiam announced by The Chief Justice. Justice
O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this
of draftsmanship"). In this author's opinion the drafters of Section 1367 could
have easily inserted a statement directly into the statute which stated that the
rules for class actions were not affected by this statute or the drafters clearly
could have codified the holding of Zahn.
12 See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Free, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Section 1367 as overruling Zahn under the plain meaning
doctrine), aff'd by an equally divided court, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam)
(same); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, 77 F.3d 928, 930-31
(7th Cir. 1996) (expanding Abbott Lab. to apply to Rule 20 joinder cases);
Gibson v. Chrysler Corporation, 261 F.3d 927, 938 (9th Cir. 2000) (same);
Romer v. Pfizer, 263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).
13See, e.g., Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding Section 1367 did not overrule Zahn under the plain meaning
doctrine); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Pauls Mercury Insurance Co., 166 F.3d 214,
218 (3d Cir. 1999) (reasoning the Section 1367 did not overrule Zahn based on
legislative history); Trimble v. ASARCO, 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000)
(same).
14 See Richard D. Freer, Essay, Compounding Confi4sion and Hampering
Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40
EMORY L. REV. 445 (1991).
Is See Thomas M. Mengler

et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's
Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 215
(1991).
16529 U.S. 333 (2000) (affirming the circuit court's ruling by a four-to-four
per curiam opinion without Justice O'Connor taking any part in the Court's
decision).
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case. " 17 Under long standing case law, an appellate court must
affirm a lower court's ruling if no majority opinion is produced. 8
Most importantly, the four-to-four decision did not answer the
question of whether Section 1367 overruled the Court's prior
holding in Zahn. This note examines whether Section 1367 was
enacted with the intent to overrule the "no aggregation doctrine."
It also tracks the development of the doctrine from a historical
prospective.
II.

HISTORY OF THE "NO AGGREGATION
DOCTRINE"
In 1911 th

Whitehead & Co.,'

Supreme Court in Troy Bank v. G.A.
9

established the meaning of the amount in

controversy requirement. 20 The Court clarified its prior holding
and stressed "when two or more plaintiffs, having separate and
distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single
suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount.," 2' However, in 1911, the Supreme Court
recognized one clear exception to this rule. The majority stated
that "when several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or
right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is
enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional
amount. , 22 This exception is very narrow and generally applies
when two or more joint property owners or debt owners sue a
third party for specific performance or enforcement of their debt;
only then may the claims be aggregated for the purpose of
establishing the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy.
This exception should be of no consequence in class actions
brought under diversity jurisdiction. The members of a class
typically do not have an undivided interest in the law suit, as do
17id.
18

Etting v. President, Directors & Co. of Bank, 24 U.S. 59, 78 (1826).

'9222 U.S. 39 (1911).
d. at 40.
21 Id. At the time of this case the jurisdictional requirement was only
$2,000. Id.
22 Id. at 40-4 1.
20
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joint property owners. The no aggregation rule set forth in Troy
Bank is still responsible for the precedents that each party must
meet their own jurisdictional amount in controversy, regardless of
whether the suit was a class action or not.
Then, in 1916, the Supreme Court in Pinel v. Pinel,23
again held "that when two or more plaintiffs having separate and
distinct demands unite in a single suit, it is essential that the
' 24
demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount. ,
Thus the "no aggregation doctrine," promulgated in Troy Bank,
was re-affirmed by Pinel. It is important to note that neither Troy
Bank nor Pinel involved class action diversity suits, but these
cases were and are still relied on as precedent in the area of class
actions.25
Relying on the rationale of Troy Bank and Pinel, the Court
in Scott v. Frazier26 for the first time applied the "no aggregation
doctrine" in a class action suit. In 1920 the Supreme Court in
Scott held that the "no aggregation doctrine" was "deeply
rooted" and "well settled" law.27 The Court clearly announced
that "[i]t is well settled that ...the amount in controversy must
equal the jurisdictional sum as to each complaint." 28 In 1939, the
Supreme Court in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 29 again applied the
"no aggregation doctrine" to a multiple plaintiff suit. 30 The
Court held that "[i]t is a familiar rule that when several plaintiffs
assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount
involved in each separate controversy must be of the requisite
amount... and that those amounts cannot be added together to
This decision again
satisfy jurisdictional requirements. '' 31
23

240 U.S. 594 (1916).

Id. at 596.
25 See, e.g., Zahn, 414 U.S. at 291.
26 253 U.S. 243 (1920).
27 Id. at 244.
24

28

Id.

306 U.S. 583 (1939). This case was the first to apply the "no aggregation
doctrine" doctrine to class action suits after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was enacted in 1938.
3 Id. at 589.
29

31id.
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demonstrated the Supreme Court's continued reluctance to relax
the amount in controversy requirement in diversity-based law
suits.
During this period, class actions were difficult to bring.
In an effort to conform the class action rules to liberal joinder

rules, Congress, in 1966, acquiesced to the proposal for a drastic
amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32
Pre-1966 Rule 23:
a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when
the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is
b) (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action;
or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
32

1966 Rule 23 is as follows:
a) PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION. One or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
b) CLASS ACTIONS MAINTAINABLE. An action may be
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:
1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
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The rule shifts the focus to the judgment in class actions and
expands the reasons for allowing such actions. The rule was
viewed as liberalizing the requirements needed to bring a class
action.'
Unexpectedly, the amendment to Rule 23 caused
somewhat of a stir amongst the circuit courts. Interestingly, in
Alvarez v. Pan American Life Insurance Co. 33 and Snyder v.
Harris,34 the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, respectively, held that the
"no aggregation doctrine" was unaffected by the congressional
amendment of Rule 23.
However, in Gas Service Co. v.
36
Coburn, the Tenth Circuit held that separate and distinct claims
brought together in a class action could now be aggregated for the

2) (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters
pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
3' 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
14 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
35 See Alvarez, 375 F.2d at 996; Snyder, 390 F.2d at 205.
36 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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purpose7 of establishing the jurisdictional requirement in diversity
cases.

3

38
However, the Supreme Court, in Snyder v. Harris,
quickly cleared up any alleged discrepancy caused by the
congressional amendment to Rule 23 in class action suits. The
Court held that "[we] have consistently interpreted the
jurisdictional statute passed by Congress as not conferring
jurisdiction where the required amount in controversy can be
reached only by aggregating separate and distinct claims. The
interpretation of that statute cannot' be changed by a change in the
Rules." 39
The Court further reasoned that "[t]o allow
aggregation of claims where only one member of the entire class
is of diverse citizenship could transfer into the federal courts
numerous local controversies involving exclusively questions of
state law." 40 Subject matter jurisdiction is limited to promote the
policy that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 4'
Otherwise, to allow the federal courts to have such power would
infringe on state sovereignty rights. 42
Notably, for the first time the Court had dissenting
Justices who wanted to abandon the "no aggregation doctrine" in
class actions.43
Justices Fortas and Douglas viewed the
amendment as shifting the focus to the judgment in a class
action.44 They noted that judgments in class actions include all
members who are a part of the class.45 They reasoned that it
would be consistent with the amendment to aggregate the claims
of the class members to meet the requisite amount in
controversy.46 In addition, the dissenters viewed 28 U.S.C.

31
38

Id at 833.

394 U.S. 332 (1969).

'9Id. at 338.
Id. at 340.

40

41id.

42 id.

41 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 353-54 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 352-53.
4s Id. at 353.
46

Id. at 354.
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§ 207247 as controlling and stated that "all laws in conflict with
such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect." 48 They stated that since the "no aggregation
doctrine" had never been codified by Congress and the 1966
version of Rule 23 had been codifed, then section 2072 should be
controlling and Rule 23 should trump the "no aggregation
doctrine. 49 However, this represents only the rationale of the
dissenters in this case, and the majority was unpersuaded by these
arguments.
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Zahn v. International
Paper Co.,5° held in class actions with multiple plaintiffs having
separate and distinct claims, each member must satisfy the
jurisdictional amount for diversity suits in federal courts. 51 The
majority had no difficulty basing their decision on the historical
interpretation of the "matter in controversy" requirement coupled
with firmly rooted judicial precedents. 52 This
case established the
"no aggregation doctrine" in class action. 53
Seventeen years after the decision in Zahn, Congress
passed 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which was drafted with the explicit

4'28

U.S.C § 2072 states:

(a)The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence

for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of
appeals.
(b)Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is
final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this
title.
48 Snyder, 394 U.S. at 350-51 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072).
49 id.

50 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
" Id. at 300-01.
52 Id.
13

Id. at 301.
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intent of overruling Finley v. United States.54 In Finley, the
55
plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act
against the United States, alleging negligence on the part of the
Federal Aviation Administration.56 Finley then moved to amend
her federal complaint to include an additional state law claim
against non-diverse parties. 57 There was no independent basis for
federal jurisdiction over this additional state law claim against the
new defendants. 58 The Court held that the state law claim did not
belong in federal court.5 9 The majority, in essence, wanted
Finley to sue in federal court for the federal claim and in state
Finley's other alternative would
court for the state law claim.
have been to bring both claims in state court. 6' This decision was
absurd in that res judicata62 would not bar a state law claim that
did not satisfy the "matter in controversy" in federal court.
However, it would bar a state or federal claim that was not
asserted in the state court. Moreover, the Court stated that if this
was not Congress' intention then "whatever we say regarding the
by a particular statute can of
scope of jurisdiction conferred 63
"
Congress.
by
course be changed
To correct the problem presented in Finley, Congress
enacted Section 1367.6$ However, vague congressional intent,
coupled with confusion in the circuit courts, unexpectedly called
into question the continuing validity of Zahn in light of the new
14

490 U.S. 545 (1989).

" Pub. L. No. 89-506, §§ 1-5(a), 8, 9, 80 Stat. 306-308 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, 2672, 2675, 2677 to 2679) (2000)).
56 Finley, 490 U.S. at 546.
57 id.
58 id.
'9 Id. at
60 id.

555-56.

490 U.S. at 555-56.
"A rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties, their privies, and so
as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the
same claim, demand, or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305
(6th ed. 1990).
63 Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
64 See 136 Cong. Rec. § 17577 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
61 Finley,
62
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statute. Was nearly a century of judicial precedent about to be
overturned by the ambiguity of congressional intent in enacting
Section 1367? Or was Section 1367 drafted by Congress with the
intent of preserving the holding in Zahn?
CASELAW FINDING THAT SECTION 1367
OVERTURNED ZAHN

III.

After the enactment of Section 1367, several circuits and
commentators interpreted the statute as either implicitly, or
explicitly overruling Zahn. 65 A string of circuit court cases have

interpreted Section 1367 as overruling Zahn by invoking the plain
meaning doctrine.66 This doctrine requires the application of a
statute's plain and customary meaning without analyzing
legislative history.67 At least one Supreme Court Justice has not
hidden his disdain for the use of such legislative history. 68 Justice
Scalia would be content if Congress provided no legislative
history at all. 69 In addition, in his view such history has no place
in determining the plain meaning or the constitutionality of a

statute.70

See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Free, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Section 1367 as overruling Zahn under the plain meaning
doctrine), aff'd, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam) (same); Romer v. Pfizer,
263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Gibson v. Chrysler Corporation,
261 F.3d 927, 938 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press
Mechanical, 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1996) (expanding Abbott Lab. to
apply to Rule 20 joinder cases); Freer,supra note 13.
66 See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Free, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Section 1367 as overruling Zahn under the plain meaning
doctrine), aff'd, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (percuriam) (same); Romer v. Pfizer,
263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Gibson v. Chrysler Corporation,
261 F.3d 927, 938 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press
Mechanical, 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1996) (expanding Abbott Lab. to
apply to Rule 20 joinder cases).
67 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1170 (7th ed. 1999).
68 Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and
61

Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990
REv. 160, 160-62.
69
70

DUKE

L.

id.
id.
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Five years after the enactment of Section 1367, the
validity of Zahn was first called into question in the circuit
courts. In Abbott Laboratories v. Free,7 1 the Fifth Circuit was
the first circuit court to hold that Section 1367 explicitly
overruled Zahn. 72 Free brought a class action under state
antitrust laws in state court.73 Abbott Laboratories removed the

case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 74 It was
determined that a Louisiana statute gave Free the right to add
attorney's fees to the "amount in controversy" requirement as a
named class representative. 75 Free's claim was for $20,000, but
when attorney's fees were added the amount was in excess of
$50,000.76 Thus, Free's claim when swelled together with the
attorney's fees satisfied the amount in controversy requirement.77
The district court ruled that supplemental jurisdiction was proper
over the claims of all the unnamed class members, despite their
failing to meet the amount in controversy requirement. 78
However, the district court exercised its discretion and declined
to use supplemental jurisdiction because the underlying issue in
disupute involved "complex and novel issues of state law. ,79
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that diversity jurisdiction
was proper and conferred by supplemental jurisdiction over the
7' 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995).

Id. at 529.
73 Id. at 525.
14 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United State have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
72

75Id. at 526.

Abbott, 51 F.3d at 526. The "matter in controversy" requirement under
Section the time of this case stated that a plaintiff's claim must be in excess of
$50,000 and the parties must be diverse.
76

77

id.

71

Id. at 526.

79 ld.

at 529.
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claims of the unnamed plaintiffs. 80 The court stated that the need
to look at legislative history exists only when a statute was
unclear, or ambiguous. 8 1 Section 1367(a) grants broad discretion
for the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
related claims, and Section 1367(b) carves out the exceptions in
diversity cases. 82 Notably, Rule 23 regarding class action is
absent from those exceptions. 83 Accordingly, the court found
Section 1367 is neither ambiguous nor unclear in any way.84
However, the, majority further reasoned that the plain meaning
doctrine should not apply if it would create a "positively absurd"
result. 85 The court stated that interpreting Section 1367 as
overruling Zahn would not create an absurd result.86
Questionably, the majority was persuaded by commentators that
would applaud the demise of Zahn because "doing so would
harmonize case law. and enable federal courts
to resolve complex
87
interstate disputes in mass tort situations."
In addition, the Seventh Circuit in Stromberg Metal Works
v. Press Mechanical88 expanded the aggregation doctrine under89
Section 1367 to include Rule 20 joinder cases as well.
Stromberg entered into a contract requiring subcontractors to be
bound by the main contract. 90 Press Mechanical issued purchase
orders, providing that the work was to be done in strict
accordance with the master contract. 9' Stromberg and Comfort
80 Id.

81

Abbott, 51 F.3d at 528-29 (citing West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v

Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991) (refusing to permit the "perception of the policy of
the statute to overcome its plain language").
82 Id. at 527.
83 Id. at 527 (Section 1367 (b) explicitly mentions Rules 14,19 and 20, but
not 23.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 529 (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 534 U.S. 64,
69 (1994)).
84
85
86

Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d at 529.

87 Id.

at 529. See also Arthur.& Freer, supra note 11 at 1008 n. 6.

88 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
90

Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 932.
Id. at 929.

91

Id. at 929-30.

89
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Control, another subcontractor, filed a diversity contract action
alleging Press Mechanical fraudulently represented that it had
the
Stromberg's claim was above
paid the contractors.92
93
not.
was
Control's
Comfort
but
requirement
jurisdictional
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "if §1367(a)

allows suit by a pendant plaintiff who meets the jurisdictional
amount but not the diversity requirement, it also allows suit by a
pendant plaintiff who satisfies the diversity requirement but not
the jurisdictional amount. " 94 The court further stated that the
95
reasoning of Zahn was not limited to class action suits.
Notably, Zahn relied on long standing precedents such as Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc.96 The court then reasoned that if Section 1367
overruled Zahn, it also overruled Clark,9 7 stating that "claims
against persons made parties under Rule 20 are forbidden, but
claims by parties who join under Rule 20 are allowed. "98 Judge
Easterbrook stated that "claims by parties joined under Rule
19 ... are forbidden [if that would spoil diversity], but claims by
parties joined under Rule 20 for convenience are allowed." 99
92

Id. at 930.

Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 930.
Id.at 931.
9'Id. at 930-32.
96 Id. at 931; 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
97 Stromberg, 77 F.3d at 931.
93

94

98 Id.

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject
to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order
that the person be made a party. If the person should join
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The court refused to look to the congressional intent of the statute
holding that Section 1367 if not intentionally,
then implicitly
100
overruled Zahn and its predecessors.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Romer v. Pfizer,'0 also held that the plain meaning of Section
1367 overruled Zahn.10 2 Romer sued Pfizer, a drug manufacturer

in state court on behalf of herself and as a class representative.' 03
Romer alleged state law claims arising from injuries to her
husband as a result of a drug named Trovan, manufactured by
as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be
made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder
of that party would render the venue of the action
improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not
Feasible. If a person as described in subdivision (a)(l)(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
determine whether in equity and good conscience the
action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to
the person or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be
lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered
in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a
claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the
pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the
provisions of Rule 23.
99 Id.
'oo Id. at 931-32.
101 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2001).
'02 Id. at 112.
103

Id.
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Pfizer. 104 Pfizer removed the case to federal court under Section
1441.105

The district court held that Section 1367 conferred

jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed class members, provided
the named class representative satisfied the amount in controversy
requirement of Section 1332.106 Romer's claim was in excess of
$75,000 and the parties were diverse. 107
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Section
1367(a) "is broadly phrased to provide for supplemental
jurisdiction over claims appended to any civil action over which
the court has original jurisdiction." 108 Section 1367, in clear
language, states that a federal court may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over those claims that "'form part of the same case or
controversy' as the claim over which 'the district courts have
original jurisdiction."' 109 The court reasoned that since Section
1367(a) does not limit supplemental jurisdiction to cases founded
solely on federal question jurisdiction, then Section 1367(a) must
be viewed as conferring supplemental jurisdiction in both
diversity cases and federal question cases. 1° Applying the
rationale of Abbott Laboratories, the Fourth Circuit focused on
the absence from Section 1367(b) of Rule 23, regarding class
actions. 111 Similarly, the court stated that "nowhere in §1367(b)
does it exempt from the normal rules of supplemental jurisdiction
persons made parties under Rule 23 [in diversity cases]." 112 The
court further reasoned that since original jurisdiction was satisfied
under Section 1332 over Romer's claim, then the claims of the
absent class members fell within supplemental jurisdiction

104id.
105 Id.

o6 Romer, 51 F.3d at 112.

107 Id.
108Id.

at 114 (quoting Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir.
1995)( quoting 28 U.S.C §1367)).
109 Id.
11

Id.

...
Romer, 51 F.3d at 115.
112 id.
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because3 they were so related by a common question of law and
fact.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in Gibson v. Chrysler
Corp.,"14 also held that the enactment of Section 1367 overruled
Zahn." 5 A class of consumers sued Chrysler Corporation for
116
using a process known as "electrocoat" for finishing their cars.
This process resulted in the exterior paint peeling from the primer
coat, especially after exposure to sun light."l 7 The class claims
were based on breach of various warranties and unfair trade and
business practices." 8 Chrysler removed the case to federal court,
but the federal court remanded it back to state court for lack of
satisfying the amount in controversy requirement."19 The
consumers amended their complaint to add another claim based
on California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, 20 which allowed
for punitive damages.' 2' Based on the amended complaint,
Chrysler again sought to remove the claim to federal court
contending that the claims of the named class representatives now
satisfied the amount in controversy. 2 2 The district court found
that the second attempted removal was mostly frivolous and
awarded sanctions and attorney's fees.1 23 Chrysler
then appealed
24
1
fees.
attorney's
and
sanctions
of
the award
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the rationale of

Abbott Laboratories and interpreted Section 1367 as overruling
Zahn. 125 However, the court refused to grant supplemental
jurisdiction over the unnamed class members because the class
representatives did not satisfy the amount in controversy
"a Id. at 114-15.
114 261 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2000).
"' Id.at 938.

"6 ld. at 931.
171d.

118 Id.
"9 Gibson, 261 F.3d at 931.
120

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 (Deering's 2003).

121id.

122Id. at

932.

123 Id.
124 Gi.
121 Gibson,

261 F.3d at 934.
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requirement.126 The court stated that "[o]ur own analysis
convinces us that Abbott Laboratories properly understood the
plain meaning of the text of § 1367, and correctly held that the
claims of unnamed class members in a diversity class action need
not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement." 127 However,
the court then searched the legislative history anyway, noting that
this is an "unusual case." 128 The majority then stated "that the
omission of ...Rule 23 ...from 1367(b), and ... overruling
Zahn, was an oversight."' 29 It was also noted that the House
Judiciary Committee report contained language "that § 1367 was
not intended to affect the jurisdiction requirements of § 1332 13in
0
diversity-only class actions" and then cited Zahn in a footnote.
In contrast, the court stated there was evidence in the Working
Paper of the Federal Courts Study Committee' 3 1 that "those
involved in drafting §1367 both knew that the language chosen
for §1367 would overrule Zahn and approved of that result on
policy grounds.' 32 The court then noted that it was not
persuaded enough to disregard the plain meaning of Section
1367. 133 The majority reasoned that to abrogate the plain
meaning doctrine would 34put many statutes in jeopardy of
inconsistent interpretation. 1
126

Id. at 943.

127
id.

"2'Id. at 938-39 (reasoning that "four courts have held that the text of §1367
is clear, but they split evenly on what that text means).
129 Id. at 939. The court stated that Senator Grassley, who sponsored the
Judicial Reform Act of 1990 repeatedly described the amendment of §1367 as
"noncontroversial" and "quite modest." Id. (citing 136 Cong. Rec. §17577
(Oct. 27, 1990)). The court then went on to say that "this is an unlikely
characterization for a provision that would open the federal courts to a
significant number of additional diversity class actions." Gibson, 261 F.3d at

939.

Id.
For the purposes of this paper this is the committee involved with the
drafting of Section 1367. The committee consisted of scholars such as Judge
Joseph Weis and Professors Thomas Mengler, Thomas Rowe, Stephen
Burbank and Larry Kramer. See 136 Cong. Rec. §17577 (Oct. 27, 1990).
'32Gibson, 261 F.3d at 940.
130

13
'

133id.
134id.
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CASELAW FINDING THAT SECTION 1367 HAS
NOT OVERRULED ZAHN

While some circuit courts have interpreted Section 1367 as
overruling Zahn, others have held that Section 1367 left the

reasoning of Zahn undisturbed. 135 In addition, the circuit courts
that hold Zahn is undisturbed refuse to accept that Congress

intended to overrule nearly a hundred years of precedents by
virtue of a "clinical error." 136 The congressional committee
notes suggest that Congress had no intention of overruling Zahn
or its predecessors.

137

The precedents relied upon by the Courts of Appeal for
the Eighth 38 and Tenth 139 Circuits for holding Zahn had not been
overruled, stemed from the historical judicial interpretation of
what the matter in controversy had come to mean in Section
1332. In Troy Bank v. G.A Whitehead & Co. 140 the Supreme
Court held "when two or more plaintiffs, having separate and

distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single
suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount. 14 1 The Supreme Court in Snyder v.

" See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Free, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Section 1367 as overruling Zahn under the plain meaning
doctrine), af'd, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam) (same); Romer v. Pfizer,
263 F.3d 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Gibson v. Chrysler Corporation,
261 F.3d 927, 938 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press
Mechanical, 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1996) (expanding Abbott to apply
to Rule 20 joinder cases); but see Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d
631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Section 1367 did not overrule Zahn under
the plain meaning doctrine); Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th
Cir. 2000) (same); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul's Mercury Insurance Co., 166
F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (reasoning the Section 1367 did not overrule
Zahn based on legislative history).
136 See Trimble, 232 F.3d at 962.
131See 136 Cong. Rec. §17577 (Oct. 27, 1990).

..See Trimble, 232 F.3d at 962.
'39 See Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir.
1998).
140 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
141Id. at 40.
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Harris'42 applied the "no aggregation doctrine" to class actions
suits. 141
Similarly, Zahn held that members of a class action must
each independently satisfy the amount in controversy, or be
dismissed from the lawsuit.' 44 The Court reasoned that it was
well founded and deeply rooted in judicial precedence that
Section 1332's matter in controversy requirement was defined to
prohibit aggregation of claims in an attempt to satisfy the
Thus, Section 1332 has been
jurisdictional requirement. 45
judicially interpreted as encompassing the "no aggregation
doctrine" within it. 146
In Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co.147 the Tenth Circuit
was the first circuit court to hold that the ruling in Zahn was
unaffected by the enactment of Section 1367.148 The plaintiffs
were farmers who contracted to grew sugar beets for Western
Sugar Co. 14 9 Plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturing process
used by the company permitted too many adulterants to adhere to
the beets that were used for the measuring samples.1 50 The
presence of these adulterants lowered the sugar content and the
amount they received for payment under the contract.' 5' The
plaintiffs then brought this suit on behalf of themselves and all
persons similarly situated for various breach of contract
theories. 52 The named class representatives satisfied the amount
in controversy requirement, but the other class members did
not.1 53 The district court ruled that supplemental jurisdiction did
dot confer jurisdiction over the unnamed class members for

142

394 U.S. 332 (1969).

141 Id. at 338-40.
144 414 U.S. at 300-01.

Id.; see also Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335.
See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 300-01.
141 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).

145

146

148

Id. at 641.

Id. at 633.
1 Id.
149

50

151
52Id.

"' Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 633.
153

Id. at 633.
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claims that 54do not satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement. 1
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the "omission
of Rule 23 from §1367(b) had no bearing on whether Congress
intended to change the rules about when a plaintiff can bring an
initial diversity-based class action upon original jurisdiction under
Section 1332's amount in controversy requirement
§1332."'
has been judicially interpreted as containing the "no aggregation
doctrine" within it.156 Based on this interpretation, Section
1367(a) can be read as supporting the "no aggregation doctrine"
in class actions.1 57 The language of both Section 1367(a) and
Section 1367(b) coincide to support each other and are evidence
"for preserving the historical and well established rules of
diversity." 5 8 Contrary to what the Courts of Appeal for the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits held, this court read the plain meaning
of the statute to support Zahn and not overrule it. " 9
However, the court stated that "[wie find it difficult to
argue persuasively that the statute is truly unambiguous when two
circuit courts of appeal have reached the opposite conclusion
from us, when a majority of district courts are in agreement with
us, and when commentators are divided." 60 The court then
followed judicial precedent in the circuit and reasoned that when
a statute is truly ambiguous we may "resort to legislative history
as an aid to interpretation." 16' The court looked to the legislative
history to explain the reasons for the exceptions. 1 62 The court
reasoned that Congress did not intend to subvert the long standing
judicial interpretation of what the amount in controversy

Id.
"' Id. at 640.
154

156 id.

57 Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640.
"'
158 Id.
15 9 Id.
16 id.
161

Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 742 (10th

Cir. 1997)).
162 Leonhard, 160 F.3d at 640.
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requirement stood for. 16 3 The legislative history "cites Zahn as
an example of the pre-Finley interpretation of the jurisdictional
requirements of §1322 that is not to be disturbed." 164 The court
stated that the legislative history clearly supports the conclusion
that Zahn and its predecessors were not to be changed by the
enactment of Section 1367.165
Similarly, in Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul's Mercury
Insurance Co. ,166 the Third Circuit also held that "no aggregation
doctrine" was unaffected by the enactment of Section 1367.167
This case arose when Meritcare was advised "that the roof on the
nursing home was structurally unsound and posed a safety
hazard." 168 The facility was closed to fix the damaged roof and
accommodations were made for residents with other
institutions. 169 St. Paul's Mercury Insurance Co. issued policies
to plaintiffs that provided for property damage and business
The insurance company denied
interruption coverage. 70
plaintiffs' claims stating that the policies covered losses from a
"roof collapse." 17 1 The three policy holders filed suit in state
court which was later removed to federal district court. 172 The
parties met the diversity requirement of Section 1332, but only
one plaintiff met the amount in controversy requirement. 17' The
district court held that supplement jurisdiction did not confer
jurisdiction 174
over parties that do not satisfy the amount in
controversy.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reasoned that Section 1367(a)
was broader than Section 1367(b). 175 Section 1367(a) was viewed
163 Id.
'64 Id.
1651d.

169

at 640-41.
at 640.
at 640-41.
166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 222.
Id. at 216.
Id.

170

id.

'66
167
168

171 Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 216.
172

id.

173

id.

174 id.

171

Id. at 221.
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in terms of federal question and diversity jurisdiction and granted
broad discretion for the district courts to grant supplement
jurisdiction, while Section 1367(b) was narrow in its application
to federal diversity-based jurisdiction only. 176 The court stated
that Rule 20 was absent from Section 1367(b) in terms of whether7 7
a Rule 20 plaintiff may assert a claim against a defendant.
Unlike the Tenth Circuit and Eight Circuits, which held that the
plain meaning of the statute supported a consistent interpretation
of Zahn, this court held the opposite. 17 8 However, the court
reasoned that this is one of those "rare cases in which the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds
with the intention of its drafters." 179 The court than searched
through the legislative history and reasoned that it supported the
"no aggregation doctrine" outlined in Zahn. 180
Finally, in Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 181 the Eighth Circuit
also held that the enactment of Section 1367 had no effect on the
Zahn holding. 82 Trimble brought this class action against Asarco
alleging that their properties were contaminated by various
environmental pollutants from the Asarco site. 8 3 They filed
several amended complaints, setting forth a CERCLA 84 private
cost-recovery claim, as well as state law claims. 85 Trimble and
the other named plaintiffs purported to represent thousands of
individuals who owned or rented property in a specified area
surrounding the site.' 86 Trimble asserted that the district court
176 Meritcare, 166

F.3d at 221.

177 Id.

Id. at 222.
Id. (quoting United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir.
1998)); see also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1882).
178

179

80

1

Id.

ms'232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000).
182 Id. at 963.
183

Id. at 950.

84 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act

of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675) (2000)).
185

186

Trimble, 232 F.3d at 950.
id.
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had subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction. 187 The district court held that Section
1367 did not confer supplement jurisdiction over claims of
unnamed class members that did not satisfy the amount in
88
controversy requirement. 1
On appeal, the court applied the reasoning of the
Leonhardt court. 189 The court reasoned that the "Tenth Circuit
decision in Leonhardt states the better view." 190 Section 1367(b)

considers "any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded solely on § 1332 of this title."' 9'
The statute provides that in diversity cases the claim must first
comply with Section 1332 before a court can exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. 192 For nearly a hundred years, courts
have applied the "no aggregation doctrine" to define the amount
in controversy requirement of Section 1332.193 "While § 1332
does not expressly refer to class actions, the Supreme Court noted
that periodic congressional amendment of the diversity statute to
alter only the amount in controversy evidences congressional
agreement with the Court's holding that "matter in controversy"
does not encompass the aggregation of separate and distinct
claims." 194
This language of Section 1367 is plain and
unambiguous on its face, and supports the conclusion that
Congress intended to keep well-established judicial precedence
untouched in diversity cases.' 9 5
V.

ANALYSIS

How should this blatant conflict be resolved? Upon closer
inspection, it is not as complicated as the circuit courts have made
187 id.

Id.
Id. at 961-62.
'90 Trimble, 232 F.3d at 961.
'9' See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
192 Trimble, 232 F.3d at 962.
188

189

193 Id.

94 d. (quoting Leonhardi, 160 F.3d at 637-40).
195

Id.'
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it. One can begin the analysis as follows: 1) What is the proper
standard to be applied when interpreting a statute?; 2) and what
was Congress' intention in creating the statute? The Supreme
Court held that if the statutory will of Congress has been
reasonably expressed in a statute, then that statute will be
regarded as conclusive. 196 This is known as the "plain meaning
doctrine." However, the Court carved out three exceptions to the
rule. The first exception is when a statute is ambiguous.
Moreover, the Court stated that "there is no errorless test for
recognizing ambiguity." 197 This means that since a district court
is afforded broad discretion for recognizing ambiguity in a
statute, then that discretion would only be reversed for abuse
thereof. The second exception is in one of those "rare cases [in
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." 1 98 The
third exception is when applying the plain meaning doctrine
would create a "positively absurd" result. 199
The text of Section 1367(a) reads as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) or as
expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in
any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or
intervention of additional parties. 2 °

'96
197
199

200

See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).

See Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571.
United States v. X-Citement Video, 534 U.S. 64, 69 (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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Applying the plain meaning doctrine, Section 1367(a) confers
supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that a district court
would have "original jurisdiction over," provided those claims
satisfy Article III's case in controversy requirement. 20 1 The
district courts have original jurisdiction over diversity cases and
federal question cases. Once the requirements of Section 1331
and Section 1332 are satisfied, a district court is granted broad
discretion in applying supplemental jurisdiction. For example, if
a district court has original jurisdiction over the named class
representative(s) under Section 1332, then a district court would
be free to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the other class
members' claims joined to the law suit.
However, Section 1367(b) states:
In any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332
of this title, the district courts shall not have
supplemental jurisdiction under sub-section (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20 or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under
rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplement jurisdiction over such claims
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.202
Applying the "plain meaning doctrine," this part of the statute
sets forth clear exceptions to 1367(a) in diversity-based litigation
in federal court. However Rule 23 is completely absent from
Section 1367(b). Moreover, Section 1367(b) is silent as to
whether a plaintiff joined under Rule 20 can use supplemental
jurisdiction and assert a claim against a party already in the
201

202

id.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
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lawsuit. Applying the "plain meaning doctrine" would mean that
the use of supplemental jurisdiction is not limited in federal
diversity class actions. This would also allow a plaintiff who was
joined under Rule 20 to aggregate his claim with some other
plaintiff who already satisfied the amount in controversy, and sue
a defendant already in the litigation. Moreover, the Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Third Circuits would agree with me in
this interpretation. This would mean that Section 1367 overrules
that "no aggregation doctrine."
However, one of the exceptions stated above is clearly
applicable to the issue of whether Section 1367 overruled the "no
aggregation doctrine." The exception is when the application of
the plain meaning doctrine will cause a result demonstrably at
odds with the intent of the drafters, then the intent will be viewed
as controlling.2 °3 If one were to read the legislative history for
Section 1367, the intent of the drafters is clear, despite the mere
two pages of legislative history enacted for such an important
statute. 20 4 "In diversity-only actions the district court may not
hear plaintiffs supplemental claims when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction would encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional
requirement of Section 1332. ,205 "The section is not intended to
affect the jurisdictional requirements of Section 1332 in diversityonly class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to
Finley." 20 6 The legislative history then cites Zahn as a case
which was intended to be preserved. 207 In viewing the legislative
intent together with the "plain meaning doctrine," it is clear that
the intent of the drafters was to preserve the long standing "no
aggregation doctrine." Clearly, the "plain meaning doctrine"
would cause a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of the
drafters. As such, the legislative history should be viewed as
controlling the statutory interpretation of Section 1367. This
analysis seems clear and to the point.

204

See Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571.
See 136 Cong. Rec. § 17577 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).

205

Id.

206

Id.

203

207 i'd.
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A similar conclusion could also be arrived at by invoking
the ambiguity exception to the "plain meaning doctrine." Several
circuits have adopted a test for recognizing ambiguity. In short,
the essence of the test states that a split in circuits is evidence
enough of statutory ambiguity. 20 8 Once ambiguity is recognized,
the Supreme Court stated that the lower courts may then review
the legislative intent or history to help determine the true
statutory meaning. 209 As stated above, once the legislative
history is probed, it is clear that Congress had no intention of
overruling the "no aggregation doctrine. ,210
CONCLUSION

VI.

Following the framework for statutory interpretation
outlined above, most circuit courts have properly interpreted the
statutory text as overruling the "no aggregation doctrine."
However, in Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co. 21' and Trimble v.
Asarco, Inc. ,22 the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, respectively, have
interpreted the text of 1367 as not overruling the "no aggregation
doctrine. ' ' 2 13 As Trimble merely adopted the Leonhardt court's
reasoning in every aspect, the focus here will be on Leonhardt.
In the author's opinion, the Leonhardt court's decision is flawed
in two ways. First, Leonhardt stated that the term "original
jurisdiction" in Section 1367(a) incorporated the "no aggregation
doctrine" into it. Thus, Section 1367(a) specifically "excepted
claims brought under §1332. , 2 14 However, the text of Section
1367(a) makes it clear that it includes both Section 1332 and
Section 1331. The text also makes it clear that Section 1367(b)
was intended to create exceptions in federal diversity-based
litigation. If Leonhardt was correct, there would be no reason
208

See, e.g., United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir.

1997).

See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
See 136 Cong. Rec. §17577 (Oct. 27, 1990).
211 160 F.3d at 631.
212 232 F.3d at 946.
213 Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 641; Trimble, 232 F.3d at 963.

209

210

214

Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640.
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whatsoever for Section 1367(b). "Such a reading of the statute
adds an exception that the language and the structure of the Act
cannot bear." 215 The text does not create such hidden barriers
for claims brought under Section 1332.
Second, the Leonhardt court read Section 1367(a) as
conferring original jurisdiction over a civil action as requiring the
district court to have original jurisdiction over the entire
complaint at the time it was filed. If this were true, it would
render the phrase "over all other claims that are so related to
Congress'
claims in the action" as virtually meaningless.
language does not restrict Section 1367(a) to limit the use of
supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. Interestingly enough,
if Leonhardt was correct it would mean that 1367(a) would not
even apply to Finley a decision which was intended to be
overruled. 216 For example,if a plaintiff brings a federal law
claim and a state law claim in federal court, and the district court
does not have original jurisdiction over the state law claim at the
time of the complaint, then supplemental jurisdiction would not
attach to the state law claim. Obviously, the Leonhardt court did
not adequately consider this decision before rendering it.
Although Leonhardt probably rendered the correct decision, the
reasoning employed was faulty.
Surprisingly enough, most of the circuit courts end their
inquiry by stating that the plain meaning of Section 1367
overrules the "no aggregation doctrine." 217 While it seems clear
that the plain meaning of Section 1367 overrules the "no
aggregation doctrine," the inquiry cannot end there. Abbott
Laboratories v. Free21 8 and Stromberg Metal Works v. Press

2'5 Romer, 263 F.3d at 116.
216 See 136 Cong. Rec. § 17577 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
217 See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Free, 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting Section 1367 as overruling Zahn under the plain meaning
doctrine), aff'd, 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam) (same);
Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th Cir.
1996) (expanding Abbott to apply to Rule 20 joinder cases).
28 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that legislative history should not
be viewed if the statute is clear).
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Mechanical219 should have continued their analysis and looked to

legislative history to see if the result of overruling the "no
aggregation doctrine" would be at odds with the intent of the
drafters. If either of these two circuits would have looked to the
legislative history, the answer would be clear.
Once the
legislative history of Section 1367 is viewed, there should be no
question that the drafters of the statute intended the long standing
and historical "no aggregation doctrine" to remain intact. When
the plain meaning doctrine would produce a result that is
demonstrably at odds with the intent of the drafters, the intent
should control. However, the only way to know the intent of the
drafters is to search the legislative history. It is this that the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits failed to do.
Moreover, failing to look to the legislative history, only
when it is at odds with the "plain meaning doctrine" is the
equivalent of a judicial slap in Congress' face. As one court put
it:

To retain this case in this court is to say to
Congress: we know what you meant to say, but
you didn't quite say it. So the message from us in
the judicial branch to you in the legislative branch
is Gotcha! And better luck next time. Such a
message is not required by the separation of
powers. Nor is it in harmony with the fact that
Congress and the courts, however different their
respective roles,
are part of a single
220
government.
The judicial branch should not act as a super-legislator by
substituting its ntent for that of Congress. Some circuit courts

77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that legislative history should not
be viewed if the statute is clear).
219

220

id.
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have agreed with this aspect of the argument, but have decided to
disregard it anyway.22I
Clearly, in Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul's Mercury
Insurance Co.,222 third Circuit Court did a thorough job in

deciding the issue of whether Section 1367 overrules the "no
aggregation doctrine." The court correctly stated that under the
"plain meaning doctrine," the text of Section 1367 specifically
overruled the "no aggregation doctrine," but refused to end the
inquiry there.223 The court then probed the legislative history and
concluded that the intent
of Congress was not to overrule the "no
224
aggregation doctrine. "

In contrast, many commentators and courts have criticized
Congress as failing to do its job in drafting Section 1367.

Thomas Arthur and Richard Freer state that the courts must be
forced to pick up the slack where Congress left off. They blame

Congress for its rush job in passing the statute.225 They further
argue that "§1367(b) is a nightmare of draftsmanship." 226 They
221

See. e.g.. Gibson v. Chrysler Corporation. 261 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir.

2000).
222 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
23 d. a
2.
U'Jd.
2

See-Freer& Arthur supra note 11, at 1013Mi. 34.

This process -amounted -to less than one day's -hearing by one
subcommittee of one house of Congress, and cursory
consideration on the floors of both houses. The Senate
Judiciary Committee never considered Section 1367 at all.
The full Senate adopted the measure as an obscure part of an
omnibus "judicial reform" bill which created new judgeships
(and patronage for the Senators), based only on Senator
Grassley's assurance that no controversial changes were
being made. Senator Grassley's brief remarks on the Senate
floor contained no mention, much less analysis, of the
supplemental jurisdiction provisions. The statute was not
read on the Senate floor and the whole business occupied a
few minutes at the end of the 1990 congressional session,
which was dominated by a budget confrontation between
Congress and the President." Id.
226 See Freer & Arthur supra note 11, at 1007.
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explain that the statute creates problems in an area that should be
problem-free and causes wasteful litigation over jurisdictional
issues. 227 As one Judge put it, "[t]he more precise and coherent
a statute, the less it permits and requires creative judicial
interpretation . . .. We are choking, not on statutes in general,
but on ambiguous and internally inconsistent statutes. , 228 They
further argue that the precedents in the area were clear before the
enactment of the statute, and that the statute itself has left open a
slew of ambiguities that cost litigating parties wasteful amounts of
money.229
In addition, Arthur and Freer argue that the question of
whether Section 1367 overruled the "no aggregation doctrine" is
one that involves simply a debate in politics. 230 On one side lies
the policy of judicial economy and on the other side lies the issue
of state sovereignty. They contend that judges that seem to favor
state sovereignty would not overrule Zahn, because it would force
possible complicated unresolved state issues to be settled in
federal court instead of state court. 23 1 The Supreme Court held in
Snyder that "[t]o allow aggregation of claims where only one
member of the entire class is of diverse citizenship could transfer
into the federal courts numerous 232
local controversies involving
exclusively questions of state law."
Since the enactment of Section 1367 the circuit courts
have refused to come to any agreement on whether the "no
aggregation doctrine" has been overruled. While Congress was
not explicit in the design of the statute itself, Congress was
explicit in its legislative history. Its intention was not to overrule
Zahn and its predecessors. To preserve the integrity between the
judicial and legislative branches, courts should give great
deference to the legislative history, only when the "plain meaning
See Freer & Arthur supra note 11, at 1007.
See Freer & Arthur supra note 11, at 1007 (quoting J. Edwards, The Role
of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal
Appellate Adjudicatiofi, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 424-25 (1983-1984).
229 See Freer& Arthur supra note 11, at 1009.
230 See Freer& Arthur supra note 11, at 1008.
231 See Freer& Arthur supra note 11, at 1008 n. 6.
227

228

232

394 U.S. at 340.
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doctrine" would create a result that is at odds with the intent if
the drafters.233 Anything other than deference to the legislative
history in these rare cases would be potentially embarrassing to
the legislative branch.

233 See Giffin, 458 U.S. at 571.
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